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ABSTRACT. It is believed that diversity is good for our society, but is it good for
financial markets? In particular, does the diversity with respect to beliefs among in-
vestors reduce the market risk of risky assets? The current paper aims to answer
this question. Within the standard mean-variance framework, we introduce hetero-
geneous beliefs not only in risk preferences and expected payoffs but also in vari-
ances/covariances. By aggregating heterogeneous beliefs into a market consensus
belief, we obtain CAPM-like equilibrium price and return relationships under het-
erogeneous beliefs. We show that the market aggregate behaviour is in principle a
weighted average of heterogeneous individual behaviours. The impact of heterogene-
ity on the market equilibrium price and risk premium is examined in general. In
particular, we give a positive answer to the question in the title by considering some
special structure in heterogeneous beliefs. In addition, we provide an explanation
of Miller’s long standing hypothesis on the relation between a stock’s risk and the
divergence of opinions.
Key words: Heterogeneous beliefs, CAPM, mean-variance analysis, diversification,
Miller’s hypothesis.
JEL Classification: G12, D84.
We are grateful to seminar participants at Peking University, at the University of Technology, Sydney,
and to participants at the First International Conference on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets (CAFM)
2006 (Seoul) and the Inaugural All China Economics (ACE) International Conference 2006 (Hong
Kong) for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Australian Research Council
(ARC) under Discovery Grant (DP0773776) for Chiarella and He is gratefully acknowledged. Dieci
acknowledges support from MIUR under the project PRIN-2004137559.
Corresponding author: Xuezhong (Tony) He, School of Finance and Economics, University of Tech-
nology, Sydney, PO Box 123 Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia. Email: Tony.He1@uts.edu.au. Ph: (61
2) 9514 7726. Fax: (61 2) 9514 7722.
1
2 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
1. INTRODUCTION
The Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966)) Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) plays a central role in modern finance theory. It is
founded on the paradigm of homogeneous beliefs and a rational representative agent.
However, from a theoretical perspective this paradigm has been criticized on a number
of grounds, in particular concerning its extreme assumptions about homogeneous be-
liefs, information about the economic environment, and the computational ability on
the part of the rational representative economic agent. From an empirical perspective
this paradigm has failed to explain a number of market anomalies including (i) the
equity premium puzzle, (ii) excess volatility, and (iii) cross-sectional returns. Much
of the CAPM literature addresses the first two empirical issues, however this paper is
largely motivated by addressing the third issue and its relation to Miller’s hypothesis.
Miller (1977) proposes a direct relationship between a stock’s risk and the divergence
of opinion about the stock. He argues that “in practice, uncertainty, divergence of opin-
ion about a security’s return, and risk go together”. Consequently, “the riskiest stocks
are also those about which there is the greatest divergence of opinion”, thus the market
clearing price of a relatively high-risk stock will be greater than that for a relatively
low-risk stock. Miller argues that the overvaluation of high-risk stocks is due to the
short-sale constraints experienced by heterogeneous investors. The traditional CAPM
with homogeneous beliefs cannot be used to explain Miller’s hypothesis.
The impact of heterogeneous beliefs among investors on the market equilibrium
price has been an important focus in the CAPM literature. A number of models with
investors who have heterogeneous beliefs have been previously studied1. A common
finding in this strand of research is that heterogeneous beliefs can affect aggregate mar-
ket returns. However, the question remains as to how exactly does the heterogeneity
affect the market risk of risky assets? It is widely believed that society can benefit
from a diversity of cultures. As an important part of society, financial markets might
be expected to reflect this view. In other words, diversity in beliefs among investors
in financial markets should reduce the market risk of assets in general. But, due to
the complexity of financial markets, this issue has not been explored explicitly in the
current literature. In much of this earlier work, the heterogeneous beliefs reflect ei-
ther differences of opinion among the investors2 or differences in information upon
which investors are trying to learn by using some Bayesian updating rule3. Hetero-
geneity has been investigated in the context of either CAPM-like mean-variance mod-
els (for instance, Lintner (1969), Miller (1977), Williams (1977) and Mayshar (1982))
or Arrow-Debreu contingent claims models (as in Varian (1985), Abel (1989, 2002)
and Calvet et al. (2004)).
1See, for example, Lintner (1969), Williams (1977), Huang and Litzenberger (1988), Abel (1989),
Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998) and Basak (2000)
2See, for example, Lintner (1969), Miller (1977), Mayshar (1982), Varian (1985), Abel (1989, 2002)
and Cecchetti et al. (2000)
3Typical studies include Williams (1977), Detemple and Murthy (1994) and Zapatero (1998)
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In most of the cited literature, the impact of heterogeneous beliefs is studied for the
case of a portfolio of one risky asset and one risk-free asset (for example Abel (1989),
Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000) and Johnson (2004)).
In those papers that do consider a portfolio of many risky assets and one risk-free as-
set, investors are assumed to be heterogeneous in their risk preferences and expected
payoffs or returns of the risky assets (such as Williams (1977) and Varian (1985)),
but not in their estimates of variances and covariances. The only exception seems
to have been the early contribution of Lintner (1969) in which heterogeneity in both
means and variances/covariances is investigated in a mean-variance portfolio context.
The hypothesis of Miller (1977) highlights the fact that the variation of dispersion in
the expected payoffs of risky assets among investors can be characterized by hetero-
geneous beliefs about the variance/covariance among investors. As suggested by the
empirical study of Chan et al. (1999), while future variances and covariances are more
easily predictable than expected future returns, the difficulties in doing so should not
be understated. These authors argue that “while optimization (based on historical es-
timates of variances and covariances) leads to a reduction in volatility, the problem of
forecasting covariance poses a challenge”. Variation in expectations among investors
is characterized as the stock’s divergence of opinion. The early empirical study by Bart
and Masse (1981) supports Miller’s hypothesis. Diether et al. (2002) provide empirical
evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower
future returns than otherwise similar stocks, in particular for small cap stocks and
stocks that have performed poorly over the past year. Johnson (2004) offers a simple
explanation for this phenomenon based on the interpretation of dispersion as a proxy
for un-priced information risk arising when asset values are unobservable. Ang et al.
(2006) examine the empirical relation between cross-sectional volatility and expected
returns and find that stocks with high sensitivities to innovations in aggregate volatility
have low average returns. Therefore, a theoretical understanding of the impact of het-
erogeneous beliefs in variances and covariances on equilibrium prices, volatility and
cross-sectional expected returns is very important for a proper development of asset
pricing theory. This paper is largely motivated by a re-reading of Lintner’s early work
and the recent empirical studies related to Miller’s hypothesis. Although these earlier
contributions discuss how to aggregate heterogeneous beliefs, the impact of hetero-
geneity on the market equilibrium price, risk premia and CAPM has never been fully
explored.
Different from the above literature, heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) have been
developed to characterize the dynamics of financial asset prices resulting from the in-
teraction of heterogeneous agents with different attitudes towards risk and different ex-
pectations about the future evolution of asset prices. One of the key elements of this lit-
erature is the expectations feedback mechanism, see Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998).
We refer the reader to Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006) and Chiarella, Dieci and He
(2009b) for surveys of recent literature on HAMs. This framework has successfully
explained various aspects of market behaviour, such as the long-term swing of market
prices from the fundamental price, asset bubbles and market crashes. It also shows
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a potential to characterize and explain the stylized facts (for example, Gaunersdor-
fer and Hommes (2007) and Farmer et al. (2004)) and various power law behaviours
(for instance Lux (2009), Alfarano et al. (2005) and He and Li (2007)) observed in
financial markets. However, most of the HAMs analyzed in the literature involve a
financial market with only one risky asset, except for some recent contributions by
Böhm and Chiarella (2005), Wenzelburger (2004), Westerhoff (2004), Chiarella et al.
(2005, 2007) and Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) showing that complex price dynamics
may also result within a multi-asset market framework. In particular, Chiarella et al.
(2007) demonstrate that heterogeneous beliefs about covariance between risky assets
can have a complicated impact on portfolio diversification and asset pricing. More
recently, Brock et al. (2009) consider a simple multi-asset pricing model with het-
erogeneous beliefs and show that more hedging instruments may destabilize markets
when heterogeneous traders adapt their behaviour according to performance-based re-
inforcement learning. In general markets with many risky assets and heterogeneous
investors, the impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and standard portfo-
lio theory remains a largely unexplored issue.
We consider a portfolio of one risk-free asset and many risky assets and extend the
mean-variance model to allow for heterogeneity not only in the means but also in the
variances/covariances across investors. The heterogeneous beliefs are considered as
given. They reflect either differences of opinion among the investors or differences in
information. By introducing the concept of a consensus belief, we show that the con-
sensus belief can be constructed as a weighted average of the heterogeneous beliefs
so that the market aggregate behaviour is in principle a weighted average of hetero-
geneous individual behaviours. In particular, we show that the market aggregate ex-
pected payoff of the risky assets is a weighted average of the heterogeneous expected
payoffs of the risky assets across the investors, where the weights are given by the
inverse covariance matrices adjusted by the risk tolerance of heterogeneous investors;
the market equilibrium price is a weighted average of the equilibrium prices under the
separate beliefs of each agent. As a consequence, we establish an equilibrium relation
between the market aggregate expected payoff of the risky assets and the market port-
folio’s expected payoff, leading to a CAPM-like relation under heterogeneous beliefs.
In particular, we give a positive answer to our earlier question by considering some
special structure in heterogeneous beliefs. This means that, together with the standard
diversification effect in portfolio theory, a portfolio of beliefs also has a diversification
effect, in particular the diversity of heterogeneous beliefs can reduce the market risk
of risky assets. In addition, we provide an explanation of Miller’s hypothesis on the
relation between a stock’s risk and the divergence of opinions. Intuitively, we show
that, without short-sale constraints, the overvaluation of high-risk stocks is due to the
diversification of the aggregate risk among heterogeneous investors. It is the diversifi-
cation effect of the aggregate risk under heterogeneous beliefs that plays an important
role in our analysis.
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The paper is organized as follows. Heterogeneous beliefs are introduced and the
standard mean-variance analysis is conducted in Section 2. In Section 3, we first intro-
duce a consensus belief, and show how the consensus belief can be constructed from
heterogeneous beliefs. We then derive the market equilibrium price of risky assets
based on the consensus belief and extend the traditional CAPM under homogeneous
belief to the one under heterogeneous beliefs. Aggregation properties and the impact
of heterogeneity are examined in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Mathematical proofs
are given in the appendix.
2. MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS UNDER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
The single period mean-variance model considered in this section is standard except
that we allow the investors to have different risk preferences, as well as subjective
means, variances and covariances. Consider a market with one risk-free asset and
K(≥ 1) risky assets. Let the current price of the risk-free asset be 1 and its payoff be
Rf = 1 + rf . Let x̃ = (x̃1, · · · , x̃K)T be the payoff vector of the risky assets, where
x̃k = p̃k + d̃k (k = 1, · · · , K) corresponds to the cum-prices with p̃k being the end of
period price of asset k and d̃k its dividend.
Assume that there are I investors in the market indexed by i = 1, 2, · · · , I . The
heterogeneous (subjective) belief of investor i, referred to as Bi, is defined with respect
to the means, variances and covariances of the payoffs of the risky assets and are
written
yi = Ei(x̃) = (yi,1, yi,2, · · · , yi,K)T , Ωi = (σi,kl)K×K ,
where
yi,k = Ei[x̃k], σi,kl = Covi(x̃k, x̃l), i = 1, 2, · · · I; k, l = 1, 2, · · · , K. (2.1)
In the following we use, in particular, the notation σ2i,j := σi,jj , j = 1, 2, · · · , K to
denote agent i’s estimate of the variance of asset j. Let zi,o and z̄i,o be the amount to
be invested and the endowment of investor i in the risk-free asset, respectively, and
zi = (zi,1, zi,2, · · · , zi,K)T and z̄i = (z̄i,1, z̄i,2, · · · , z̄i,K)T
be the selected risky portfolio and the portfolio endowment, respectively, of investor i
in the risky assets. Then the end-of-period wealth of the portfolio for investor i is
W̃i = Rfzio + x̃
Tzi.
Then, under the belief Bi, the expected value and variance of portfolio wealth W̃i are
given, respectively, by
Ei(W̃i) = Rfzi,o + yTi zi, σ2i (W̃i) = zTi Ωizi. (2.2)
We now make the following standard assumptions under the mean-variance frame-
work.
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(H1) Assume the expected utility of the wealth generated from the portfolio (zi,o, zi)
of investor i has the form Vi(Ei(W̃i), σ2i (W̃i)), where Vi(x, y) is continuously
differentiable and satisfies Vi1(x, y) := ∂Vi(x, y)/∂x > 0 and Vi2(x, y) :=
∂Vi(x, y)/∂y < 0.





Assumption (H1) is in particular consistent with the constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA) utility function Ui(w) = −e−Aiw with normally distributed w. Here
Ai > 0 corresponds to the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) coefficient. In this
case, investor-i’s optimal investment portfolio is obtained by maximizing the certainty-
equivalent of his/her future wealth, Ci(W̃i) = Ei(W̃i) − Ai2 V ari(W̃i), and therefore
Vi(x, y) = x− Ai2 y. Under assumption (H2), θi = Ai, which is the CARA coefficient
of investor i. Based on this, we refer to θi as the risk aversion measure and τi = 1/θi
as the risk tolerance of investor i.
Under (H1), the optimal portfolio of investor-i of risky assets z∗i and risk-free asset




subject to the budget constraint
zi,o + p
T
o zi = z̄i,o + p
T
o z̄i, (2.3)
where po = (p1o, p2o, · · · , pKo)T is the vector of market equilibrium prices of the risky
assets, which is to be determined. We can then obtain the following Lemma 2.1 for the
optimal demand of investor i in equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1. Under assumptions (H1) and (H2) and the heterogeneous belief Bi =




i [yi −Rfpo]. (2.4)
Lemma 2.1 shows that the optimal demand of investor-i is determined by his/her
risk tolerance and his/her belief about the expected payoffs and variance/covariance
matrix of the risky assets’ payoffs. We will see that, in the market equilibrium, the
optimal demand depends on the dispersion of expected payoffs of investor-i from the
aggregate expected market payoff.
3. CONSENSUS BELIEF, EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICES AND CAPM
In this section, we first define a consensus belief. By construction, we show the
existence and uniqueness of the consensus belief. The market equilibrium prices of
risky assets are then derived by using the consensus belief.
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A market equilibrium is a vector of asset prices po determined by the individual






z̄i := zm, (3.1)
which defines the market portfolio zm. To characterize the market equilibrium, we
introduce the following definition of consensus belief.
Definition 3.1. A belief Ba = (Ea(x̃), Ωa), defined by the expected payoff of the risky
assets Ea(x̃) and the variance and covariance matrix of the risky asset payoffs Ωa, is
called a consensus belief if and only if the equilibrium price under the heterogeneous
beliefs B = {Bi}Ii=1 is also the equilibrium price under the homogeneous belief Ba.
The following Proposition 3.2 indicates that such a consensus belief can be uniquely
constructed and the market equilibrium price can be characterized by the consensus
belief.
Proposition 3.2. Under assumptions (H1) and (H2), let τa =
∑I
i=1 τi be the aggregate
risk tolerance. Then

































The results of Proposition 3.2 are very intuitive. First, the market risk tolerance τa
is an aggregate risk tolerance of all the investors. Secondly, if we treat the heteroge-
neous beliefs as a probability state space and the weights {τi/τa}Ii=1 as a probability
measure of the heterogeneous beliefs, then the consensus belief can be interpreted as
the expectation of the heterogeneous beliefs under this risk tolerance measure. More
precisely, the inverse covariance matrix under the consensus belief is the expectation
of the inverse covariance matrices of the heterogeneous beliefs under the risk tolerance
measure, and the expected payoff under the consensus belief is the expectation of the
expected payoffs of the heterogeneous beliefs under the risk tolerance measure. This
interpretation is particularly useful when we come to examine the diversification effect
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under aggregation in the next section. It will also be very useful to think of the beliefs
as random variables following certain distributions.
The equilibrium price determined in Proposition 3.2 can be used to establish a
CAPM relationship in either the prices or returns of the risky assets. In fact, the value
of the market portfolio zm in the market equilibrium is given by Wm,o = zTmpo and its
future payoff is W̃m = x̃Tzm. Hence, under the consensus belief Ba,
Wm := Ea(W̃m) = Ea(x̃)Tzm, σ2m := V ara(W̃m) = zTmΩazm. (3.6)
Based on Proposition 3.2 and the above observation, we obtain the following CAPM-
like price relation under heterogeneous beliefs. We shall call this relationship the Het-
erogeneous CAPM (HCAPM) in price.
Corollary 3.3. In equilibrium the market aggregate expected payoff of the risky assets






Ea(x̃k)−Rfpk,o = σ(W̃m, x̃k)
σ2m
[Ea(W̃m)−RfWm,o], k = 1, 2, · · · , K, (3.8)
where Ωa = (σkj)K×K and σ(W̃m, x̃k) =
∑K
j=1 zm,jσkj for k = 1, · · · , K corresponds
to the covariance, under the consensus belief, between the market payoff of the risky
asset k and the aggregate market portfolio payoff W̃m.
The HCAPM price relation (3.7) can be converted to the standard CAPM-like return











− 1, Ea(r̃m) = Ea(W̃m)
Wm,o
− 1.
With these notations, we can obtain from (3.7) the following HCAPM relation between
returns of risky assets and the market portfolio.
Corollary 3.4. In equilibrium, the HCAPM price relation (3.7) can be expressed in
terms of returns as
Ea[r̃]− rf1 = β[Ea(r̃m)− rf ], (3.9)
where
β = (β1, β2, · · · , βK)T , βk = cova(r̃m, r̃k)
σ2a(r̃m)
, k = 1, · · · , K,
and the mean and variance/covariance of returns under the consensus belief Ba are
defined similarly in terms of returns.
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The equilibrium relation (3.9) is the standard CAPM except that the mean and vari-
ance/covariance are calculated based on the consensus belief Ba. The β coefficients of
risky assets depend upon not only the covariance between the market returns and asset
returns, but also the aggregation of the heterogeneous beliefs. We have thus shown
that a CAPM-like relationship still holds under heterogeneous beliefs.
The main obstacle in dealing with heterogeneity is the complexity and heavy no-
tation involved when the number of assets and the dimension of the heterogeneity
increase, as illustrated in Lintner (1969). Lintner (1969) is the first paper to consider
the problem of market equilibrium in the same setup as in this paper. Surprisingly,
this significant contribution from Lintner has not received much attention until recent
years. This might be due to the notational obstacle mentioned above, which makes
the paper not easy to follow, and renders rather difficult the analysis of the impact of
heterogeneity on the market equilibrium price. Proposition 3.2 shows not only the ex-
istence of the consensus belief but also how it can be constructed explicitly from the
heterogeneous beliefs. The equilibrium asset pricing formula is the standard one under
the consensus belief. It is the explicit construction of the consensus belief in Proposi-
tion 3.2 that overcomes the notational obstacle of Lintner’s contribution and makes it
possible to examine the impact of heterogeneity on the market. The following section
is devoted to examining the impact of different aspects of heterogeneity on the market
equilibrium price, equity risk premium and the market aggregation in general.
4. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY IN BELIEFS
In this paper, heterogeneity is characterized by the diversity of risk aversion coeffi-
cients and investor beliefs in expected payoffs and variance/covariance matrices of the
payoffs of the risky assets. Understanding the impact of different aspects of hetero-
geneity when the market is in equilibrium is important for a proper understanding of
asset pricing theory.
4.1. The impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium price. Consider first
the relationship between the market equilibrium prices under heterogeneous beliefs
and the prices in a series of markets populated by homogeneous investors with the
beliefs of the respective investors in the original heterogeneous belief market. Note
that the market equilibrium price (3.4) in Proposition 3.2 is exactly the same as the
traditional equilibrium price for a representative agent holding the consensus belief
Ba. If we define pi,o as the equilibrium price vector of the risky assets for investor i as
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Using the interpretation of expectation under the τ measure introduced in the previous










This means that the aggregate market equilibrium price is the expectation of the equi-
librium prices of all investors under their beliefs, weighted by the inverse covariance
matrices. This relationship between the market equilibrium price under heterogeneous
beliefs and prices under alternative homogeneous beliefs indicates that the market
equilibrium price reflects a weighted average of the prices under individual beliefs.
For given market risk tolerance (τa) and covariance matrix (Ωa), the market equilib-
rium price is bounded above by the price determined by the investor who is less risk
averse and optimistic, and below by the price determined by the investor who is more
risk averse and pessimistic. In general, the equilibrium price is dominated by investors
who are less risk averse and optimistic about the expected payoff. This observation
is very intuitive. Consistent with Miller’s argument, the market price may reflect the
expectations of only the most optimistic (but less risk averse) minority, as long as this
minority can absorb the entire supply of stock.
4.2. Equity risk premium and diversification effect. We first examine the equity
risk premium. It follows from the equilibrium price equation (3.4) that the equity risk
premium, Ωazm/τa, is negatively related to the aggregate risk tolerance τa but posi-
tively related to the covariance between the risky assets and the market portfolio Ωazm.
Note that, for a given market portfolio zm and risk tolerance τa, when investors have
homogeneous beliefs about covariance matrices so that Ωi = Ωo, then Ωa = Ωo and
hence the risk premium is unchanged when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about
expected payoffs. However, when investors have heterogeneous beliefs of covariance
matrices, then the heterogeneity does affect the risk premium. What we would like to
know is, how exactly does heterogeneity or dispersion of beliefs among heterogeneous
investors affect the risk premium? This is an important but difficult question to answer
in general. In the following discussion, we try to tackle this question from different
perspectives by considering some special cases.
To simplify our analysis, consider the special case where the risky asset payoffs
are uncorrelated. In this case, the covariance matrix Ωi becomes a diagonal matrix.
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σ2a,jzm,j], j = 1, · · · , N. (4.3)
To examine the effect of the market aggregation in terms of the covariance matrix, we
consider two cases.
Case 1: In the first case, we compare the variances of any portfolio under both the
aggregate covariance matrix and the average belief of the heterogeneous covariance
matrix defined under the probability measure {τi/τa}Ii=1. The first diversification effect
of the aggregate beliefs of covariance is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Assume the payoffs of risky assets are uncorrelated, and define4.
σ2a(z) = z
T Ωaz, σ2(z) = z






Then for any given portfolio z we have σ2a(z) ≤ σ2(z), and σ2a(z) = σ2(z) only if all
Ωi are the same.
Note that when Ωi = Ωo for all i, then Ωa = Ω̄ = Ωo. Corollary 4.1 implies that,
when asset payoffs are uncorrelated, if we treat the risk tolerance weighted heteroge-
neous variances of risky assets as a benchmark, the aggregate (or market consensus)
belief of the covariance Ωa leads to smaller portfolio risk. That is, the market aggre-
gation lowers the asset portfolio risk, leading to lower equity risk premium, higher
equilibrium price, and lower expected return. This diversification effect of risk due to
the market aggregation in equilibrium helps us to understand one aspect of the impact
of heterogeneity on the risk premium.
Case 2: In the second case, we consider the dispersion of beliefs among investors.
The investors may have the same belief of the expected payoffs of the risky assets, but
different levels of confidence in their beliefs. The different levels of confidence can
be measured by the heterogeneous beliefs of variances. In the following, we introduce
the concept of a mean preserving spread5 to compare the heterogeneity in variances
among different assets and examine the impact of the mean preserving spread on the
risk premium. The basic intuition is best understood in the special case of two investors
and two risky assets, for which we first introduce the following definition.
4The reader should contrast the definition of Ω̄ with that of Ωa in (3.2).
5The mean preserving spread introduced here is different from the one used in the stochastic dominance,
but shares the same underlying idea.
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Definition 4.2. Let σ2j = (σ21,j, σ22,j) be the heterogeneous beliefs of the variance of
asset j = 1, 2 among the two investors and ω = (ω1, ω2) be a positive weighting
vector satisfying 0 < ωi < 1 and ω1 + ω2 = 1. We define the weighted mean of the





2,j, j = 1, 2.
Assume σ21,1 ≤ σ22,1 for asset 1. Then a combination of beliefs of variances for asset 2
is called a mean preserving spread of that for asset 1 if
σ21,2 ≤ σ21,1, σ22,2 ≥ σ22,1
and σ22 = σ
2
1.
Thus this mean preserving spread has the property that the weighted mean of the
variances of the two assets are the same but agent one has greater confidence in the
payoff of asset 2 while agent two has greater confidence in the payoff of asset 1. With
this definition, we can measure belief dispersion among two assets and examine the
impact of heterogeneity in variances on the equity risk premia. We obtain the following
result on the diversification effect of the mean preserving spread of beliefs of variances.







σ21,1(1− ε), σ22,1(1 + δ)
}
with 1 > ε > 0 and δ = ε
ω1σ21,1
ω2σ22,1
, is a mean preserving spread of beliefs of variance for


















Corollary 4.3 provides a condition under which a mean preserving spread of the be-
liefs in variances results in a reduction of aggregate market risk. Note from Definition
4.2 that σ21,1 ≤ σ22,1. It follows from the conditions for a mean preserving spread that
σ21,2 ≤ σ21,1 ≤ σ22,1 ≤ σ22,2. Thus agent 2 is ‘less confident’ than agent 1 in his/her belief
about the expected payoffs of both assets, in the sense that σ21,j ≤ σ22,j for j = 1, 2.
Before rewriting (4.4) in a slightly different way and discussing its implications, we
consider two particular cases.








, j = 1, 2,
defines a risk-tolerance weighted average of variances. Substituting ωi = τi/τa into
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which is always true because σ21,1 ≤ σ22,1 by assumption. This is not surprising, be-
cause we are comparing a harmonic mean and an arithmetic mean using the same
weights, see also the previous Case 1. This implies that, when the weights are defined
by the risk tolerance, a mean preserving spread of beliefs in variances always reduces
the market risk, leading to a lower equity risk premium, a higher market price and a
lower expected return.








defines a risk-aversion weighted average of variances. Substitute ωi = θi/(θ1 + θ2)








2,1 ≥ θ21(σ21,1)2(1− ε),








Also in this case a mean preserving spread of variance beliefs is able to reduce market
risk, for a wide set of combinations of parameters, provided that the risk aversion
coefficient θ2 of agent 2 is large enough. For a general weighting vector (ω1, ω2), the




2 − τ2ω1(σ21,1)2 + εω1σ21,1(τ1σ22,1 + τ2σ21,1) ≥ 0.




2 − τ2ω1(σ21,1)2 ≥ 0,










This is obviously much more general than (4.6) but it can be interpreted along similar









Both conditions (4.7) and (4.8) implies that a mean preserving spread of beliefs in
variances reduces market risk when the risk aversion coefficient of the less confident
agent (that is the one with higher variance belief, being agent 2 in our case) is large
enough. If a higher variance can be interpreted as a measure of the doubt of an investor
with respect to the expected payoff of a risky asset, then the diversification effect due to
a mean preserving spread of beliefs in variances holds when the doubt and risk aversion
14 CHIARELLA, DIECI AND HE
of investors are positively correlated. Intuitively, a positive correlation between doubt
and risk aversion makes the less risk averse and more confident investors dominate the
market, which in turn results in a higher market equilibrium price and a lower equity
risk premium for the asset.
4.3. Miller’s hypothesis. We now discuss Miller’s hypothesis within our framework.
Based on the construction of the consensus belief in Proposition 3.2, one can see that
the heterogeneity of beliefs in covariance affects the market expected payoff only
when the beliefs of investors are heterogeneous in expected payoffs, too. In fact, if
investors agree on the expected payoff, Ei(x̃) = Eo(x̃), then it follows from (3.3) that
Ea(x̃) = Eo(x̃), even though they may disagree on their risk preferences, variances







which reflects a risk tolerance weighted average opinion of the market on the expected
payoffs of risky assets. In this case, the expected market payoff is dominated by in-
vestors who are less (more) risk averse and optimistic (pessimistic) about the expected
payoff, as we would expect when market prices move up (down), although such dom-
inance may be asymmetric in different market conditions. Alternatively, the aggregate
expected payoff may be unchanged even though investors have divergent opinions on
their expected payoffs, this would be the case if their risk tolerance weighted expecta-
tions are balanced.
According to Miller, if investors’ average opinion about future payoff is the same
for two firms, the divergence of opinion among investors reflects disagreement and the
firm about which a greater divergence of opinion will have more extreme optimistic
investors than the one about which less divergence of opinion. Hence the market price
should be higher for the firm with a greater divergence of opinion, which in turn gen-
erates lower expected return. Diether et al. (2002) and Ang et al. (2006) find empirical
evidence that stocks with higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts earn lower
future returns than otherwise similar stocks. This evidence provides empirical support
for Miller’s hypothesis. Within the framework of this paper, we are able to provide
an explanation and condition for Miller’s hypothesis to hold. Following the discussion
in the previous part for the two investors and two assets case, we assume that both
assets 1 and 2 have the same expected payoffs, but investors disagree on the dispersion
of the payoffs of the two assets. That is, we assume that both investors have homo-
geneous beliefs about the expected payoffs of risky assets 1 and 2 but have different
risk aversion coefficients and heterogeneous beliefs about variances of the assets. The
homogeneous beliefs in the expected payoff reflect the same opinion on the average
expected payoff for the two assets and heterogeneous beliefs in the variances reflect di-
vergence of opinion in the dispersion of the payoffs. In this case, the market expected
payoffs for the two assets are the same. If we assume that the belief in variance of
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asset 2 is a mean-preserving spread of variance beliefs about asset 1, and if investor-2
is more risk averse than investor-1 (in the sense of condition (4.7)) or (4.8)), then it
follows from the discussion in the previous subsection that the aggregate variance of
asset 2 is less than that of asset 1. Thus, from the equilibrium price equation (4.3),
the equilibrium price for asset 2 is higher than the equilibrium price for asset 1. This
in turn implies that asset 2 has lower expected return than asset 1. In other words,
stocks with higher dispersion in expected payoffs have higher market clearing prices
and earn lower future expected returns than otherwise similar stocks. This result is
consistent with Miller’s hypothesis that divergence of opinion and risk “go together”.
It is also interesting to note that this kind of argument cannot hold when investors have
homogeneous beliefs.
4.4. The impact on the optimal demands and trading volume. Finally, we con-
sider the impact of heterogeneity on the optimal portfolios and trading volume. Propo-
sition 3.2 (iii) implies that the equilibrium demand of an individual investor has two
components. The first term τiΩ−1i [Ei(x̃) −Ea(x̃)] corresponds to the standard myopic
demand. It reflects the dispersion of the investor’s expected payoff from the market ex-
pected payoff. This implies that optimistic (pessimistic) investors will take long (short)
positions in risky assets. When short selling is not allowed, the market price would be
higher than the equilibrium price, in particular this is the case when the optimistic in-
vestors are less risk averse, as Miller has argued. The second term (τi/τa)ΩaΩ−1i zm
corresponds to the so-called hedging component. It reflects the covariance of the pay-
offs between risky assets and the market portfolio, weighted by investor’s risk toler-
ance and beliefs. The hedging position of investors is long (short) when the payoffs
of the risky asset and the market portfolio are positively (negatively) correlated. When
an investor’s expected payoff is the same as the aggregate expected payoff, that is,
Ei(x̃) = Ea(x̃), the investor’s demand is simply determined by the second component.
When investors are homogeneous in the covariance matrix Ωi = Ωo, the second
component reduces to (τi/τa)zm, which is a risk tolerance weighted average share of
the market portfolio. In this case, the equilibrium demand of investor i reduces to
z∗i = τiΩ
−1
o [Ei(x̃)− Ea(x̃)] + (τi/τa)zm, (4.10)












From (4.10), one can see that the optimal portfolio of investor i is different from the
market portfolio unless the investor’s belief is the same as the market aggregate be-
lief. From (4.10) and (4.11), it follows that a risk-tolerance weighted mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of the expected payoffs among investors will not change
the equilibrium price, but will spread optimal demands among investors around the
average market portfolio, this in turn will increase the trading volume in the market.
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This implies that a high trading volume due to diversified beliefs about asset expected
payoffs may not necessarily lead to high asset prices. If the deviation of investors’ ex-
pected payoffs from the average expected payoff does not change, investors demands
will not change. However a high average of the expected payoffs will lead to a high
market equilibrium asset price. This suggests that a higher (or lower) market price
due to a higher (or lower) average expected payoff may not necessarily lead to higher
trading volume.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper provides an aggregation procedure for the construction of a market con-
sensus belief from the heterogeneous beliefs of different investors. This allows us to
characterize the market equilibrium in the traditional mean-variance model under the
consensus belief. Various impacts of heterogeneity are discussed. In particular, the
impact of diversity of heterogeneous beliefs is examined. We show that the market
aggregate behaviour is a weighted average of heterogeneous individual behaviour, a
very intuitive result. The weights are proportional to the individual risk tolerances and
the covariance matrix. For example, the market equilibrium price reflects a weighted
average of the individuals’ equilibrium prices under their own beliefs. We have es-
tablished an equilibrium relation between the market aggregate expected payoff of the
risky assets and the market portfolio’s expected payoff, which leads to the CAPM-like
relationship under heterogeneous beliefs. By considering some special structure of
heterogeneity in beliefs, we show that diversity of beliefs reduces the market risk. Our
results also provide a simple explanation for Miller’s hypothesis on cross-sectional
expected returns which is supported by some recent empirical studies.
This paper provides a simple framework for dealing with heterogeneous beliefs and
aggregation. The framework has been extended recently along several directions. First,
by imposing a mean-preserving spread distribution on heterogeneous beliefs and con-
ducting a statistical analysis based on Monte Carlo simulations, He and Shi (2010)
show that diversity in heterogeneous beliefs among investors can improve the Sharpe
and Treynor ratios of the market portfolio and the optimal portfolios of investors,
demonstrating further the diversification effect of heterogeneous beliefs. Secondly,
when the heterogeneous beliefs are formed in the rates of returns rather than payoffs
of risky assets, Chiarella et al. (2009a) construct a consensus belief (with respect to
the means and covariances of the risky asset returns) to represent the aggregate market
belief when the market is in equilibrium, extend the analysis further to a repeated one-
period set-up, and establish a framework for a dynamic CAPM using a market frac-
tion model in which agents are grouped according to their beliefs. The exact relation
between heterogeneous beliefs, the market equilibrium returns and the ex-ante beta-
coefficients is obtained. By incorporating the three most popular types of investors,
fundamentalists, chartists and noise traders, into the model, Chiarella et al. (2010)
further show that, independent of the fundamentals, there is a systematic change in
the market portfolio, risk-return relationships, and time varying betas when investors
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change their behaviour, such as the chartists acting as momentum traders. In partic-
ular, it demonstrates the stochastic nature of time-varying betas and shows that the
commonly used rolling window estimates of time-varying betas may not be consistent
with the ex-ante betas implied by the equilibrium model. The results provide insights
into an understanding of time-varying beta. Thirdly, when there is no riskless asset,
He and Shi (2009b) extend the framework in this paper and Chiarella et al. (2009a)
and the standard Black’s zero-beta CAPM to incorporate heterogeneous beliefs. They
show that in general the subjective optimal portfolios of heterogeneous investors are
mean-variance inefficient and the traditional geometric relation of the mean variance
frontiers with and without the riskless asset under homogeneous beliefs does not hold
under heterogeneous beliefs. He and Shi (2009a) further examine the impact of the
disagreement among agents on the market equilibrium and equity premium by consid-
ering a market of two risky assets (with correlated returns) and two agents who have
different preference and heterogeneous beliefs in the mean and variance/covariance
of the asset returns. When the differences in opinion are formed as mean preserv-
ing spreads of a benchmark homogeneous belief, they examine explicitly the impact
on the market equilibrium and equity premium, showing that the risk tolerance, op-
timism/pessimism and confidence/doubt jointly can generate a high equity premium
and a low riskfree rate. Overall, the framework developed in this paper provides a
solid foundation for the characterization of the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on the
market equilibrium.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1
Proof. Let λi be the Lagrange multiplier and set
L(zi,o, zi, λi) := Vi(Ei(W̃i), σ2i (W̃i)) + λi[(z̄i,o + pTo z̄i)− (zi,o + pTo zi)].











= λipko, k = 1, 2, · · · , K. (A.2)













for k = 1, 2, · · · , K. Then (A.1) and (A.2) become




σi,klzi,l = λipko, k = 1, 2, · · · , K. (A.4)
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Substituting (A.3) into (A.4) leads to
Vi1[yi,k −Rfpko] + 2Vi2
K∑
l=1
σi,klzi,l = 0, k = 1, 2, · · · , K, (A.5)
which in matrix notation can be written as
Vi1[yi −Rfpo] + 2Vi2Ωizi = 0.
This, together with assumption (H2), leads to the optimal portfolio (2.4) of investor i
at the market equilibrium. ¤
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2













i [yi −Rfpo]. (B.1)




























This leads to the market equilibrium price (3.4). Inserting (3.4) into the optimal de-
mand function of investor-i in (2.4) we obtain the equilibrium demand (3.5) of investor-
i for the risky assets. The uniqueness of the consensus belief follows from the unique-
ness of the equilibrium price and the construction. ¤
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.3
Proof. From (B.2) and (3.6),
0 < σ2m = τa[Ea(W̃m)−RfWm,o]
and hence
Ea(W̃m)−RfWm,o = σ2m/τa. (C.1)
On the other hand, from (3.4),
Ea(x̃)−Rfpo = Ωazm/τa.
This last equation, together with (C.1), lead to the CAPM-like price relation (3.7)
under heterogeneous beliefs in vector form. ¤
DO HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS DIVERSIFY MARKET RISK? 19
APPENDIX D. PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.4
Proof. We divide throughout by pk,o on both sides of (3.8), then
[Ea(r̃k)+1]−[rf+1] = Wmoσ(W̃m, x̃k)
pkoσ2m
[(Ea(r̃m)+1)−(rf+1)], k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
That is,















APPENDIX E. PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.1
Proof. In fact, in this case, it follows from (4.2) that the aggregate variance of asset j,
σ2a,j , is a weighted harmonic mean of the beliefs in variance. It is well known that, for




i=1 αif(xi) holds for αi > 0
satisfying
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. The equality holds if and only if all xi are the same. Using










APPENDIX F. PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.3
Proof. For ε > 0, we can verify that both assets have the same average σ22 = σ
2
1 for
the chosen δ > 0. Now we compute the consensus variances (that is the variances
determined by market aggregation) σ2a,1 and σ
2

















2,1(1 + δ) + τ2σ
2
1,1(1− ε)
τaσ21,1(1− ε)σ22,1(1 + δ)
,





. The proof then follows from
imposing σ2a,2 ≤ σ2a,1. ¤
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